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INTRODUCTION

California's worsening rental housing problems have prompted a
continuing debate over their nature and magnitude, as well as state and
local government responses. Rent control has been the most controversial measure sponsored by local government to promote more
affordable rental housing in California.
This article does not generally review the debate over rent
control- the arguments of proponents and opponents are already
known. I Typical major arguments made by opponents can be summarized as contentions that rent control:
1. is not justified by market conditions;
2. will deter the new construction of rental housing;
3. will lead to undermaintenance, and eventually, housing abandonment;
4. will lead to demolition and conversion of rental housing for
more profitable nonresidential uses, reducing the supply of housing;
5. results in bureaucratic, inefficient, and expensive administration;
6. will result in inequitable distribution of short-term benefits;
7. will result in landlords refusing to rent some units, discriminating against some tenants, and charging some tenants ilkgally high rents;
8. results in unnecessarily high rent increases while failing to
make rents "fair"; and
9. adversely affects the tax base and shifts the tax burden.
Rent control proponents contest these conclusions. They argue
that rent control does benefit tenants, does stabilize the rental market,
and does not have the adverse impacts claimed by its opponents.
Accordingly, proponents are against federal and state preemption or
restriction of local rent control, while opponents favor such preemption.
This article examines the evolution of rent control in California
over the past decade, together with its current status, administration,
relevant litigation, and its future prospects. The primary policy focus
will be the question of California's preempting local rent control, concluding that there is no immediate demonstrable justification for state
1

3
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intervention. [See biographical note on the writer and his position with
respect to rent control.]

THE RENTAL HOUSING CRISIS

According to the California Department of Housipg and Community Development (HCD), 1,435,000 lower-income California
renters (37 percent of all renters) were paying more than one-quarter
of their income for rent in 1981.2 HCD notes that the "inability of
increasing numbers of households to afford suitable housing" is the
most widespread housing problem, with half of all California renters
now paying more than they can actually afford.3 This conclusion lends
fuel to the fires of rent-control debates since an acceptable rent-toincome ratio is not established. California still adheres to the 25 percent rent-to-income ratio as the standard of affordability under state
housing programs, but the federal government in 1981 increased its
standard for tenants in federally assisted housing to 30 percent. 4
While rents generally lagged behind inflation and increased tenant
income in the early 1970s, this relationship changed recently in many
areas as rents rose faster and tenants' real income (income adjusted to
changes in consumer prices) declined.s Between December 1978 and
December 1982 rent increases virtually equaled the overall inflation rate
in the San Francisco Bay region. Rents increased annually by an average of 11.7 percent while inflation increased by 11.6 percent. 6
This occurred while four Bay Area cities adopted rent regulations
(San Francisco, Oakland, Berkeley and Hayward). Lower-income
tenants have been especially hard hit by this trend. To what extent
most tenants can afford increases and just how much they can afford
remains controversial because of disagreement over what constitutes a
generally acceptable rent-to-income ratio.
Another source of great concern is the decline in new housing
construction. The tight rental housing market prevailing in California is
attributable in part to the drastic decline in new construction. HCD
estimates that 315,000 units must be built annually through 1985 to
meet the state's housing needs, but does not distinguish between housing ownership and renting.7 OnJy 210,000 units were constructed in
1979 (83,000 multiples); 145,000 in 1980 (58,000 multiples); and in
1981 new housing production plummeted to 105,000 (45,000 multiples). 8 While precise data are lacking on the types of new multiple-unit
housing being built, the United States General Accounting Office
(GAO) reports:

[T]he majority of multifamily housing units currently being
built are either (1) subsidized, (2) high-rent, or (3) condominiums.9
If this pattern holds true in California, most tenants would be
unable to afford either new market-rate rental housing or condominium
housing.IO The Reagan administration's cutbacks in federal housing
assistance and the budgetary restrictions preventing California's state
and local governments from providing adequate housing subsidies mean
that there will not be enough new subsidized rental housing built to
meet the needs of those lower-income tenants who cannot find
affordable existing apartments.
In many urban areas, "tight" rental housing markets have
developed and rental vacancy rates have fallen below the normal 5 percent. Data on rental vacancy rates in California are usually based on
postal surveys conducted for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and
the United States Census Bureau. Controversy surrounds the questions
of what constitutes an acceptable rental vacancy rate, and what the
actual rates are in those communities where rent control is an issue.
The debate over the magnitude of the rental housing problem is
also being conducted at the national level, where there are disagreements on whether a crisis exists and how to resolve the rental housing
problem. II While this debate has continued, numerous California communities have considered and adopted local rent control since 1978 to
make rental housing more affordable.
THE EMERGENCE AND SPREAD OF
LOCAL RENT CONTROLS IN CALIFORNIA

Berkeley became California's first locality since World War II to
adopt rent control. While Berkeley's 1972 charter amendment initiative
was ruled unccnstitutional by the California Supreme Court in 1976,
the ruling confirmed the right of any local government to enact rent
control under its police power to alleviate serious housing problems.
(This litigation is discussed in more detail below). That same year the
California Legislature enacted a measure to ban local rent control, but
Governor Brown vetoed the bill.
The 1978 Proposition 13 property tax reform campaign sparked
the expansion of local rent control in California. The sponsors of Proposition 13 promised tenants a share of the benefits from reduced property taxes. After Proposition 13 passed most landlords not only
refused to provide voluntary rent rebates but actually increased rents,
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whereupon tenants protested and demanded governmental action.
Governor Brown and the state's largest holders of rental property made
well publicized but unsuccessful efforts to convince owners to roll back
rents to pre-Proposition 13 levels or pass property tax savings on to
tenants. The Legislature rejected a proposal to mandate a partial rebate.
Tenants then turned to local government for relief via rent control. A May 1979 California Poll indicated that Californians supported
rent control by a margin of 56 to 21 percent, with tenants in favor by a
73 to 20 percent margin.l2 Approximately 55 percent of California's
residents are tenants. However, rent control has not been universally
adopted for several reasons. In many communities, especially the
suburbs, rental housing problems are not seen as critical, especially
where tenants constitute a minority of the population. Where rent control has been proposed, most local governments have opposed it, and
the state and local real estate industry has also strongly opposed rent
control.
As of 1982, 11 California localities have rent control laws (which
cover, with certain exemptions, apartments and/or mobile homes, and
residential hotels) .13 (See Table 1.)
In addition, 31 localities (three counties and 28 cities) have
mobile-home rent control ordinances.14 These ordinances typically
establish rent review commissions that arbitrate rent disputes between
mobile-home-park operators and tenants.
Finally, at least three California localities have considered the
adoption of commercial rent controls. In 1982 Berkeley became the
first California city to enact commercial rent control. IS
Numerous other California cities have considered residential rent
controls but have rejected them. The voters of 22 cities have rejected
27 proposed rent control initiatives since 1977. Five of these initiatives
would have required landlords to rebate part of their Proposition 13
property tax savings to tenants. The most prominent defeats of rent
control initiatives occurred in Berkeley (1977), Long Beach (1980),
Oakland (1980 and 1982), Pasadena (1981), San Diego (1980), San
Francisco (1978 and 1979), Santa Barbara (1978), Santa Cruz (1979,
1980 and 1982), and Santa Monica (1978).
In contrast, seven cities have enacted rent control by initiative:
Berkeley (four different initiatives), Cotati, Davis, Hemet (mobile
home), Palm Springs, Santa Monica, and Thousand Oaks.I6 Subsequently, the first Berkeley initiative and the Cotati, Davis, and Palm
Springs initiatives were ruled unconstitutional by the courts.
California stands second only to New Jersey (where more than
100 municipalities have adopted rent control) as the state with the largest number of local rent-control measures.

5

TABLE 1
California Rent-Controlled Jurisdictions (1982)

County

City and County

Los Angeles

San Francisco

Cities
Berkeley
Beverly Hills
Cotati
Hayward
Los Angeles
Oakland
Palm Springs
San Jose
Santa Monica

POSSIBLE STATE PREEMPTION OF LOCAL CONTROLS

State governments have three alternatives in dealing with local
rent control: (1) they may preempt, reserving to the state the exclusive
authority to regulate rents; 17 (2) they may permit local-option rent control, but require adherence to state-legislated guidelines; 18 or (3) they
may allow local rent control, subject only to judicial review.19
Governor Brown vetoed the preemption alternative in 1976. Subsequently the Legislature rejected the local option-state guideline
approach in 1978 and 1979. California has traditionally been a strong
home-rule state. Consequently local governments may adopt local
rent-control ordinances.
Faced with the proliferation of such local rent controls, and the
state's refusal to intervene, a coalition of California real estate industry
groups placed an initiative-to restrict local rent control-on the June
1980 state ballot. This proposed constitutional amendment would have
invalidated all existing local rent-control legislation, and required mandatory referenda for any future adoptions. Moreover, any such local
rent controls adopted in the future would have had to conform to statewide standards, the most important of these restrictions being:
1. annual rent adjustments must be allowed, equal to the annual
increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI);
2. vacated apartments must be exempt from rent-increase ceilings;
3. single-family residences must be exempt;

7
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4. rent controls must be administered by appointed committees
rather than elected boards; and
5. no just-cause eviction requirement would be required.
The initiative also would have blocked rent rollbacks and registration of
controlled units, as well as other important features of the more restrictive local laws sponsored by tenant advocates. The highly controversial
measure was resoundingly defeated, 65 percent to 35 percent, 20 so that
California has no mandatory state standards governing lqcal rent control, 21 except for the special federal and state preemptions noted below.

FEDERAL AND STATE PREEMPTION
FOR SUBSIDIZED HOUSING
In 1975 the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) issued regulations prohibiting the application of
local rent control to privately owned, federally subsidized rental housing, 22 and in 197 5 the California Legislature exempted all rental housing assisted by the California Housing Finance Agency (CHFA) from
local rent control. 23
Broader proposals have been introduced in Congress, but not yet
enacted, to make localities eligible for some federal housing assistance
on condition that they eliminate or restrict local rent control. In April
1982 the President's Commission on Housing recommended the adoption of such a preemption policy.2 4 While broader federal or state rentcontrol preemption remains a possibility, California localities are
currently free to regulate the rents of privately owned rental units,
except for those subsidized or insured by HUD or CHFA.
It is inadvisable to generalize about the cost, administration,
impact, and legal status of California's rent controls because they vary
considerably, and the differing features of local controls need to be
taken into account.
Governor Brown's California Housing Task Force identified the
following 10 criteria as important in analyzing rent controls: (1) statement of legislative intent, (2) vacancy rate required to justify rent control, (3) exemptions, (4) appropriate administrative agency, (5) criteria
for determining hardship, (6) criteria for rent increase, (7) vacancy
decontrols, (8) adjustment of base rents, (9) method of implementation (via initiative, referendum, or local ordinance), and (10) duration
and termination. 25 These factors will be considered in discussing California rent controls, which are classified as strong, moderate, or weak.26
Moreover, the coverage, stringency, administration, and enforcement

of rent control often vary according to the relative political influence of
organized landlords and tenants.
Strong Rent Control
Strong rent control characterizes Santa Monica and Berkeley, both
with voter-approved initiatives drafted by tenant groups. Both have:
(1) broad coverage of units, (2) mandatory registration of units,· (3)
annual rent-increase adjustments based on landlords' increaSed operating and maintenance expenses (as determined by an elected board), (4)
no provision for decontrolling units on vacancy, and (5) termination
only if the rental vacancy rate returns to normal.
Santa Monica's much-publicized rent control law is certainly
California's strongest. In addition to rent and eviction controls, it
includes demolition and condominium conversion controls, and is
administered by an elected rent control board unique in the United
States.27 (The constitutionality of Santa Monica's rent control law,
including its fair return formula, is discussed later.)
Berkeley's current law, adopted by initiative in 1980, is modeled
after Santa Monica's but does not cover demolitions or condominium
conversions (regulated by separate ordinances). From its inception,
Berkeley's rent stabilization program has faced well-organized landlord
opposition. When a landlord-supported slate won a 5-4 city council
majority in Berkeley's April 1981 election, the balance on the councilappointed board shifted from one primarily sympathetic to tenants to
one primarily sympathetic to landlords. 28 Amid continued turmoil,
Berkeley voted to strengthen the law in 1982 and to replace the
appointed board with an elected board beginning in 1984.29
Moderate Rent Regulation
Moderate rent regulation characterizes the rent control and arbitration ordinances passed by local action in Los Angeles (the city), San
Francisco (city and county), and San Jose. They are less restrictive
than those proposed by tenant advocates and enacted by voter initiative
(like Santa Monica's and Berkeley's). The most important differences
include: (1) less restrictive coverage, (2) automatic annual general percentage rent increases (7 or 8 percent) unrelated to landlords' cost
increases, (3) vacancy decontrol-temporarily allowing a landlord to
charge a market rent for a vacated unit, which is again subject to controls after reoccupancy, (4) a different approach toward rent-adjustment
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appeals by landlords and tenants, emphasizing mediation and a more
flexible definition of a fair return for landlords, and (5) sunset clauses
for termination of rent control.
Both types of rent control typically exempt newly constructed
apartments and allow landlords to pass the costs of capital improvements on to tenants. The moderate rent-control localities have no ceilings on such pass-through costs, whereas both Santa Monica and Berke15 percent on all allowable rent
ley impose annual overall ceilings
increases and make them conditional on landlord compliance with housing and health codes.
In 1982 all three moderate rent-control cities extended their ordinances indefinitely. While San Francisco refused to restrict vacancy
decontrol or require landlords to register, it strengthened tenant protection, requiring landlords to apply for prior approval of any rent
increases over the annual 7 percent guideline. Previously, tenants had
to appeal to challenge such increases.
Los Angeles requires landlords to register, allows them an
automatic annual 7 percent rent increase, exempts luxury rentals and
single-family units, and temporarily decontrols vacated units. In
1982, after a heated but inconclusive controversy over vacancy decontrol, Los Angeles extended rent control indefinitely. In November
1982 Los Angeles voted against amending its charter to give new construction permanent exemption from rent control. In March 1982 San
Jose also extended its rent arbitration ordinance indefinitely.
Some observers have maintained that once adopted, rent control
policies would inevitably become stricter due to tenants' political pressure, 30 but so far this has not happened. While some ordinances have
been strengthened (e.g., San Francisco), several cities (including Davis
and El Monte) did not extend their initial temporary measures, and the
interpretation and administration of Berkeley's law changed dramatically
after landlords won an electoral victory in 1981. On the other hand,
landlord-sponsored initiatives to weaken rent control were rejected in
Santa Monica (1980) and Berkeley (1981). Thus the fortunes of rent
control have waxed and waned, with both landlords and tenants gaining
and losing in tum.

9
ments. In reviewing tenant appeals of landlord rent increases that
exceed its ceiling, Oakland's rent-arbitration board has generally
approved much larger increases than other localities allow. 31 Oakland
voters have twice rejected rent control initiatives. Los Angeles County
also allows landlords to increase rents annually by 10 percent, and permanently decontrols all vacated units. Los Angeles County voted to
phase out rent control in 1983.
Mobile-home rent control is the weakest form of rent control
found in California. Twenty-eight California cities and three counties
have enacted mobile-home rent controls, in addition to localities whose
regular rent controls cover both apartments and mobile homes. Usuthese ordinances simply allow mobile-home tenants to appeal any
rent increases to a commission appointed by the city council to arbitrate
disputes, but without specific guidelines and formulas.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF LOCAL RENT CONTROLS

Only fragmentary information concerning the administration of
rent control is available, since local rent control boards are not required
to report to either local or state government. No serious evaluation has
been made of rent control administration. 32 For comparative purposes,
however, Table 2 illustrates the relative status of rent control in Los
Angeles (city), San Jose, San Francisco, and Santa Monica, as of March
1982.
In California, funds to finance the cost of tent control administration can come either from the localities' general fund or from landlord
and tenant fees for registration and appeals. Since local rent control is
financed almost entirely through landlord and tenant fees, so far it
presents no significant financial burden to localities and requires no
state assistance. If changes are necessary to improve the administration
of rent control, these can and should be made locally.

RENT CONTROL LITIGATION

Weak Rent Control
Oakland and Los Angeles County have weak rent controls.
Oakland's rent arbitration law resembles the moderate forms of rent
regulation just described, but it allows an automatic annual general rent
increase of 10 percent and does not have just-cause eviction require-

Numerous constitutional challenges to municipal rent control have
been filed with the California courts. This activity has many parallels
with property owners' suits challenging land-use regulation under
California's Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Coastal Protection
Act, and local zoning ordinances (especially controls on condominium

10
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TABLE2
Administration of Local Rent Control

City
Los Angeles
San Jose
San Francisco
Santa Monica

Controlled
rental
Annual
units
registration
Budget
(approx.) fee (per unit) (FY 1980-81)
472,000
52,000
unknown
16,000

$7
$3
none
$72f

$2.7 million
$253,000
$194,000
$2.6 million

Staff

Landlord
and tenant
petitions
(cumulative
total)

70
5
9
50

7,470
3,354
5,034
1,790

a. Santa Monica's disproportionately large registration fee, staff, and budget reflect the
high costs of legal defense of an often-challenged ordinance.

conversion and growth).
The leading rent control case is Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 33 in
which the California Supreme Court upheld local governments' right to
enact rent controls in order to deal with serious rental housing problems. The court, however, also ruled Berkeley's 1972 rent control initiative unconstitutional, because its individualized procedures for rent
adjustments violated landlords' rights to due process: the local initiative
measure did not allow annual general rent adjustments, and its procedure for making individual adjustments was too cumbersome.
In Citizens against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, a case involving an unsuccessful 1977 Berkeley rent control initiative, the state Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Berkeley
ceiling on individual campaign contributions. 34 This ruling was subsequently reversed by the United States Supreme Court, which invalidated the limitation. 35
The wide margin by which landlords typically outspend tenants in
rent-control initiative elections remains a major campaign financing
issue in California. 36 Tenants have won several initiative campaigns,
and in June 1980 did defeat Proposition 10 (which was seen by
opponents, e.g., as causing inflationary rent increases and eliminating
current local rent control laws). The spending imbalance nevertheless
has been a factor in the defeat of most local rent-control initiatives in
California. The state Supreme Court so far has interpreted a rent control ordinance in only one other case, 37 but it probably will be called
upon to resolve major issues being litigated in the lower courts.

Perhaps the most critical issue is to determine the meaning of the
California Supreme Court's 1976 ruling that rent-controlled landlords
are constitutionally entitled to "a just and reasonable return on their
property." Landlords and tenants usually disagree as to what constitutes
a fair return on the landlord's investment, as reflected in controlled
rents. Various fair-return formulas have been devised, but the courts
have failed to define "fair" return. 38
Landlords have challenged as confiscatory the fair-return provisions of the Berkeley, Cotati, and Santa Monica rent control initiatives,
as interpreted and applied by their rent control boards. They have also
challenged provisions of several mobile-home rent control ordinances.
The Santa Monica rent control board's fair-return formula has received
the most judicial scrutiny to date. The board's initial formula provided
for a fair return based on historical cash investment. In March 1981 a
trial judge tentatively ruled this formula unconstitutional because it
discriminated on the basis of length of ownership, declaring that landlords are entitled to a fair return on their property's current market
value. Before this decision was implemented, however, the board
revised the formula, adopting a net operating income (NOI) standard
that guaranteed Santa Monica's landlords maintenance of their pre-rent
control net income (with an allowance for inflation). In February 1982
this new formula was ruled constitutional.
The California Supreme Court, like its counterparts in other rentcontrolled jurisdictions, will have to address the complex problem of
what constitutes a fair return, with substantial economic consequences
for both landlords and tenants. The outcome will affect the impact of
rent control on the maintenance and sale of buildings and on tenants'
housing costs. In February 1983 the Supreme Court agreed to review
an appellate decision invalidating Carson's mobile-home rent control
ordinance based, in part, on the absence of a fair-return formula. 39 The
court may also have to address related issues such as the constitutionality of overall annual rent-adjustment ceilings (i.e., 15 percent) and
antispeculation clauses that prohibit the consideration of increased debt
service caused by a landlord's purchase after the imposition of rent control.40 Judicial review will continue to impose limits on the scope and
application of local rent control in California.
STUDYING THE IMPACT OF RENT CONTROL

In the early stages of rent control it is difficult to judge its impact
on the local housing market. 41 Often data are difficult to obtain, the law
is amended, and other factors affect controlled housing. California's
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existing rent control ordinances have been in effect only for approximately three years. Most have been significantly amended, prompting
uncertainty as to the form and duration of controls. Accurate data on
regulated rental housing are difficult to obtain unless units are
registered. Primary reliance must be placed on US census ·data or fragmentary local information.

The Rand Impact Study: Los Angeles
Despite these difficulties there have been several studies of local
rent control in California addressing most of the issues related to its
impact.
The most systematic research was done by the Rand Corporation.
Rand's nonempirical 1981 study on rent control in the City of Los
Angeles concluded: (1) there is no demand-induced rental housing
crisis, since the rental vacancy rate is almost normal, (2) tenant mobility has declined, (3) some rental units have been removed, (4) there
have been only slight reductions in maintenance, and (5) new production has not been reduced.42 The "no crisis" finding was the most controversial of the five, partly because a previous UCLA study had concluded that the city's rental vacancy rate was virtually zero.43
Another critical study of Los Angeles rent control concluded that
its benefits were inversely related to income, that benefits have been
unfairly transferred from landlords to tenants, and that rent control will
impede new construction to the detriment of tenants. 44 Los Angeles,
faced with these conflicting studies, extended rent control indefinitely,
with an evaluation to be done in 1986.

(CALPIRG) found that Berkeley tenants generally observed little, if
any, change in their building and maintenance services after a year of
rent controi.46 This study did not, however, measure actual changes in
the maintenance of Berkeley's rent-controlled housing.

Vacancy Decontrol
The impact of vacancy decontrol is a controversial issue. Los
Angeles (city) and San Francisco both allow landlords to charge new
tenants an uncontrolled market rent, as opposed to the annual 7 percent ceiling for occupied rent-controlled units. In both cities, once
vacated apartments are rerented they are again subject to rent control.
A UCLA study found an average annual rent increase of 18 percent in
vacated units, compared to only 8 percent for units without tenant turnover.47 Median rents for vacated units in San Francisco increased by 30
percent in 1980, according to a city planning department survey.48
These data underscore landlords' support for and tenants' opposition to vacancy decontrol (whether temporary or permanent). In 1981,
San Francisco refused to place a ceiling on rent increases in vacated
units; in 1982, Los Angeles decided against permanent decontrol for
vacated units.

New Construction and Housing Supply

In reviewing the Santa Monica rent-control program and its
impact in connection with court litigation, UCLA economist David
Shulman concluded on behalf of the city that between 1978 and 1980
the nominal values of rent-controlled apartments increased as a result of
allowable rent increases, although real values declined because landlords lost potential additional income.45 Experts speaking for the landlords claimed that considerably greater value reductions had already
occurred because of rent controls, and they projected even larger reductions in the future.

Rent control's impact on new construction is also controversial,
although new construction is presently exempted by all California rentcontrol ordinances. In any event, little new unsubsidized rental housing is being built in California, either in controlled or noncontrolled
communities.
Only one comprehensive study has sought to assess the impact of
rent control on housing supply. After considering rent control in six
California cities, the study concluded that control is reducing the
number of available rental units by deterring new construction, and
encouraging demolitions and condominium conversions.49 The study,
however, was flawed because it was done shortly after the institution of
rent controls, too soon to assess the full impact, and it failed to include
a control group of "free-market" cities. The study also identified special
circumstances in each city that reduced the impact of rent control on
the housing supply, e.g., land-use controls restricting growth.

Building and Maintenance Services

Needed: Better Information and More Research

Effect on Values: Santa Monica

An opinion poll by the California Public Interest Research Group

More empirical data are needed to assess the impact of rent con-
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trol. California now requires local redevelopment agencies to prepare
annual reports on their activities for the local governing bodies;50 such
a requirement could be extended to local rent-control boards. Such
mandatory annual reports would provide more systematic data on the
scope, administration, cost, and impact of local rent controls without
imposing any serious fiscal burdens on localities.
By 1984 rent control will have been in effect for five years; a
statewide survey would be timely. Accordingly the state, should consider conducting a statewide rent-control impact study similar to those
recently commissioned by the Office of Planning and Research on condominium conversion controls (locally regulated), and by the Department of Housing and Community Development on the relocation
activities of local redevelopment agencies (state-regulated). A systematic state-commissioned study that would assess the impact of rent
control could provide valuable data needed to enlighten a debate so far
fueled more by rhetoric than by facts.

ALTERNATIVES TO RENT CONTROL

Rent control advocates generally acknowledge that controls provide no long-term solution to the rental housing crisis. There is general
agreement on the need for vast increases in the supply of affordable
rental housing to meet the heavy demand that has contributed to
extraordinarily low vacancy rates. In the face of this need, California's
production of new multifamily housing has declined drastically in recent
years. According to the HCD, this is the cause of a "very tight supply
of rental units."51
Moreover, most new unsubsidized multifamily housing is too
expensive for the great majority of California tenants. Recent high
mortgage-interest rates and land-price inflation have helped to drive up
the costs for new housing. Restrictive land-use and environmental
regulations have further increased the costs. 52 An additional stimulus is
the increase in dedication requirements and fees charged for new housing developments, charges that local governments imposed after the
1978 passage of Proposition 13.53
Both the Governor's California Housing Task Force (in 1979) and
the Governor's Task Force on Affordable Housing (in 1981) recommended measures to promote the construction of affordable housing.
The California Legislature has subsequently adopted many of these
measures, but so far they have been inadequate to solve the problem.
Thus in 1979-1980 the Legislature required regional planning for

fair-share housing, 54 provided density bonuses, 55 permitted the vesting
of development rights, 56 and restricted growth controls.57 California
localities have also pioneered in the development of inclusionary zoning
to provide more affordable housing. 58
In 1979, recognizing the critical need for subsidized housing, the
state appropriated $100 million for a rental housing construction program finally implemented in 1982.59 The state also authorized several
new forms of mortgage finance to encourage more capital investment in
housing,60 and is attempting to persuade public employees' pension
funds to invest in affordable housing.61
The state's affirmative housing efforts have been countered by
drastic federal budgetary cutbacks in housing subsidies; the Reagan
administration is also proposing others. In view of current fiscal problems the state is not likely to commit additional funds to subsidize new
or existing housing. Local governments are suffering from cutbacks in
both federal aid and Proposition 13 bailout funding by the state. Localities have not used tax-exempt mortgage revenue bonds effectively to
finance affordable multifamily housing, largely because of the prevailing
high interest rates. As interest rates decline, this form of housing
finance will become more important unless the federal or state
government further restricts its use.
While some affordable housing can still be built through the innovative combination of available housing subsidy programs, tax incentives, and regulatory policy, this cannot satisfy the current and projected demand for affordable rental housing.
PRESERVING AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING
BY REGULATION
In the absence of much greater subsidies for more affordable
housing, many California localities must rely on regulation to preserve
the existing supply of moderately priced rental housing. The tight
market has prompted many landlords to turn their property to more
profitable uses, such as converting rental units into high-income condominiums. To prevent, or at least reduce tenant displacement, and to
preserve scarce rental units, many California communities have adopted
condominium-conversion controls. 62
There has also been some use of demolition controls, as well as
additional limitations on the conversion of hotel rooms and apartments
to other uses. Thus demolition of rental housing in favor of nonresidential construction prompted Berkeley and Santa Monica to adopt
demolition controls. In 1979 San Francisco became the first US city to
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regulate the conversion of single-room occupancy (SRO) residential
hotels to preserve them as affordable housing. Berkeley and San Francisco also regulate the conversion of apartments into commercial uses
in certain districts.
All of these approaches are designed to preserve existing rental
housing at more affordable prices, until long-term solutions can be
found.63

SUBSIDIZING TENANTS
Since concern with problems of poorer tenants is a primary purpose of rent control, opponents of such controls often urge direct
governmental subsidy of low- and moderate-income tenants. This
approach was favored by the President's Commission on Housing,64
which recommended the conversion of HUD's Section 8 housing assistance program into a housing voucher system providing direct rent subsidies to low-income tenants. 65 While there is a good deal of debate
over the best use of available rent subsidies to assist poorer tenants,
reduced federal housing assistance clearly will mean that the needs of
California's lower-income renters, as documented by HCD, cannot be
met in the unregulated private market. For this reason, rent control
will continue to be an important short-term strategy used by local
governments to deal with the lack of affordable housing.
Rent-control opponents, however, argue that its long-term disadvantages outweigh any short-term benefits for poor tenants, who may
benefit proportionately less than other tenants. 66

MEDIATING LANDLORD-TENANT RENT DISPUTES
Voluntary landlord-tenant mediation boards have been proposed
as an alternative to rent control. At least 20 California localities,
including Alameda County and the cities of Mountain View,
Sacramento, Santa Cruz, San Diego, and Palo Alto, have established
such boards in recent years.67 Appointed by the local governing body,
mediation boards and volunteer mediators usually have not been able
to resolve landlord-tenant disputes over rent increases.
Mediation has proven effective only where arbitration is mandated
if voluntary mediation fails. This is the approach followed in the
moderate and weak forms of California rent control described. Arbitration is more likely than voluntary mediation to be effective in dealing
with widespread rent disputes because landlords are not usually willing

to comply with mediators' unfavorable decisions, or even to subject
rent increases to mediation.

CONCLUSION

California's already serious rental housing problems will undoubtedly grow worse in the short run, but there is considerable debate as to
the scope and depth of the problem. Thus the 1980 UCLA and 1981
Rand studies provided dramatically contrasting assessments of the seriousness of rental housing problems in the City of Los Angeles. The
Rand study found "no housing crisis" in Los Angeles, whereas the
UCLA study reported a phenomenally low rental vacancy rate of virtually zero, suggesting a crisis-level shortage.
A recent HUD study found no current national shortage of rental
housing, 68 a view contradicted in recent reports by the US General
Accounting Office and the National Urban Coalition, who conclude that
the nation's rental housing conditions are worsening. 69 It has also been
suggested that the rates of household formation and population growth
will decline in the 1990s, thus leading eventually to a drop in housing
demand. 70
Many California communities with serious rental housing problems, typified by very low rental vacancy rates and higher than normal
rent increases, will probably continue their rent controls, or enact controls if none presently exist. In short, California can reasonably expect
to have widespread local rent controls in the 1980s, unless there is a
marked change in the supply and price of rental housing.
The policy choice facing California relates to state intervention.
Since the rental housing situation varies widely throughout the state,
there seems to be no immediate need for statewide rent controls.
Moreover, while local rent-control laws vary, their impact is
largely on the local community, so the lack of uniformity in ordinances
and in administration does not yet require the imposition of statewide
standards. Until there is evidence of statewide problems, state intervention does not seem necessary. The state's policy of allowing but not
requiring other local housing regulatory policies-e.g., controls on eviction, condominium conversion, demolition, and growth-also seems
appropriate for rent regulation. As yet, there is no convincing evidence
that short-term local rent controls have directly caused any of the
alleged negative effects of rent control, for example, reduction in the
supply of rental housing because of noninvestment in new construction;
conversion of rental units and abandonment; poor maintenance; or
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reduced tenant mobility and unit turnover.
The largest amount of empirical evidence available on rent
control's impact is from New York City, which has had rent controls
continuously for the past four decades. The numerous studies and
their conclusions have been debated heatedly. 71 The debate continues
as New York City and the State of New York consider the periodic
renewal of local-option rent control. Further, the New York city rent
control experience is not directly relevant to that of California because
of major differences in the housing stock (e.g., age and condition) and
the various types of rent control prevalent in New York City, especially
prior to 1974. In 1980 the New York State Temporary Commission on
Rental Housing recommended changes in rent control, but the legislature did not adopt them. 72
A few major studies of New Jersey's local rent controls since their
inception in 1972 have also produced hotly debated conclusions. 73 To
date the New Jersey Legislature has rejected legislation for state intervention in local rent control.
The real estate industry continues to oppose what it considers to
be overly restrictive local rent control. Consequently it is likely that
there will continue to be proposals for state preemption or restriction of
local rent control.
Until the State of California has compelling reasons either to
enact statewide rent controls, or to limit the scope of local ordinances,
local government should be allowed to continue to experiment with
controls that are consistent with California's home rule tradition. The
courts will continue to act as arbitrators of rent control conflicts when
necessary.
The state can and should review and monitor local rent controls
(via HCD's review of the housing elements of local general plans),
require local annual reports by rent control agencies, and consider commissioning a statewide survey of local rent controls and their impact. 74
These actions would provide the state with the data necessary for a
determination as to whether in the future it may be necessary and
appropriate for the Legislature to circumscribe local government's
power to regulate private rental housing.
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